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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THRESHOLD DETERMINATION OF THE STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: WASHINGTON ADOPTS A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH-EQUITABLE REMEDIES: LACHES DEFENSE RE-

STRICTED-Hayden v. City of PortTownsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 613 P.2d
1164 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 14, 1976, a Port Townsend realtor sought to rezone property
from public use' to general commercial use. 2 After several public hearings and meetings,3 the city council authorized the rezone on March 1,
1977. 4 Any specific development proposal would require further council

1. This zoning district, P-I (public use), is misleading in name because private parties can use
property with this classification for a number of private, commercial uses, such as boat sales and
professional buildings, in addition to the many permitted public uses. See note 2 infra.
2. The 1969 Port Townsend Comprehensive Plan was developed under authority of WASH. REV.
CODE § 35A.63.060 (1979). Under a comprehensive Port Townsend zoning ordinance adopted in
1971, the zoning classification P-I (public use) was given to property which would be used primarily
for schools, public buildings, parks, and related uses. PORT TOWNSEND, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §

17.16.010 (Supp. 1980). The redistricting sought was C-Il (general commercial use), which is described in the zoning ordinance as "[p]rimarily a general commercial district for the conduct of enterprise which depends on proximity to major streets or arterials for trade or transportation." Id.
The Port Townsend zoning ordinance lists 241 categories of property uses. Forty-two are permitted
in the P-I (public use) district, including many public uses, such as public transportation shelters,
public utility installations, water and sewage treatment plants, libraries, jails, hospitals, churches,
and colleges. In addition to these public uses, several private uses are allowed which are compatible
with the public uses: garages, pleasure boat marinas, boat sales, retirement homes, and professional
buildings. Id.
One hundred and twenty-seven uses are permitted in the C-il (general commercial) district. Retail
outlets are prominent among the permitted uses, including grocery stores and clothing retailers. Id.
The minutes of the Port Townsend Planning Commission hearing on September 27, 1976, indicate
that the reason for the rezone request was a desire to construct a community shopping center and to
provide motel sites. Minutes of the Port Townsend Planning Commission (Sept. 27, 1976) (on file
with the Washington Law Review). "Hotels and inns" are permitted in the C-II but not the P-I
district.
Theoretically, for purposes of the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), the Planning Commission's decision to grant or refuse the rezone request should not have taken into consideration the
possible use to which the rezoned property might be put. See note 5 infra.
3. The Port Townsend Planning Commission held a public hearing on Oct. 25, 1976, before
recommending that the city council approve the rezone. Minutes of the Port Townsend Planning
Commission (Oct. 25, 1976) (on file with the Washington Law Review). The city council held meet-

ings on December 7, 1976, and January 4, 1977, to discuss the rezone before approving it. Minutes
of the Port Townsend City Council (Dec. 7, 1976 & Jan. 4, 1977) (on file with the Washington Law
Review).
The named plaintiffs, Stephen Hayden and Jeneen Hayden, were present and spoke at the planning
commission hearing and the first city council meeting.
4. Port Townsend, Wash., Ordinance 1780 (Mar. 1, 1977).
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approval. 5 Safeway Stores, Inc. ,6 announced in May of 1977 its intention
to build a store on part of the rezoned property and submitted an environmental checklist 7 to the city engineer.
The Port Townsend city engineer 8 discussed with Safeway environ5. The Washington Court of Appeals described the mechanics of controlling land development in
Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wn. App. 573, 565 P.2d 1179 (1977). In Ullock, the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) in controversy addressed only the environmental impact of the rezone without addressing the specific impact of each of the 56 potential uses under the new zoning classification.
The court approved of the generalized EIS:
The zoning action itself [to which the EIS was addressed] will have no immediate environmental
consequences. . . . This decision does not violate SEPA as a matter of law, so long as the
[Bremerton City] Council retains the authority to implement those environmental policies at the
project stage. . . . [T]he City can and must require an environmental impact statement at the
development permit stage, where a major action is contemplated which significantly affects the
quality of the environment.
Id. at 583, 565 P.2d at 1185 (emphasis added).
See also Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn. 2d 856, 869-71, 586 P.2d 470,
478-79 (1978) (Hamilton, J., dissenting). In Bellevue, Justice Hamilton decried the requirement of a
threshold determination for simple actions such as the inclusion of property by annexation. According to Justice Hamilton, the threshold determination should be required when plans are developed for
the annexed land.
The supreme court followed this two-stage approach in Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn.
2d 870, 613 P.2d 1164 (1980). Safeway did not seek approval of its plan to build a store on the
rezoned land until after the rezone had been approved. Although the Port Townsend Planning Commission minutes for September 27, 1976 indicate that the commission knew plans were in the offing
for a grocery store on the site, theoretically that information should have had no bearing on the rezone
decision.
The court of appeals distinguished Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd. in Spokane
County Fire Protection Dist. No. 8 v. Spokane County Boundary Review Bd., 27 Wn. App. 491, 618
P.2d 1326 (1980). The court noted that Bellevue was decided before the effective date of the Guidelines of the State Environmental Policy Act (Guidelines), and it held that the City of Spokane Plan
Commission as lead agency fulfilled its duties under the Guidelines. Id. at 495, 618 P.2d at 1328-29.
6. The other two defendants were the City of Port Townsend and the Swains. The Swains, owners of Swains General Store in Port Angeles, Washington, purchased another portion of the rezoned
property intending to develop it commercially. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870,
876, 613 P.2d 1164, 1168 (1980).
The issues facing Safeway and the Swains were identical. Because the court referred to these two
defendants collectively as Safeway, this note will do the same.
7. Completing the environmental checklist is a procedure required by the Guidelines which interpret and implement the State Environmental Policy Act, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-365
(1977). As required by section 805(3)(b) of the Guidelines, the City of Port Townsend has adopted

the checklist provision verbatim.

PORT TOWNSEND, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE

§ 19.04.020 (Supp.

1980).
8. Under the Guidelines, every private and public project proposal proponent is assigned to one
agency, called the lead agency, charged with the duty of complying with the threshold determination
procedures set forth in the Guidelines. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-300 (1977). When the lead
agency concludes that an EIS must be prepared, it is responsible for ensuring that the procedures for
the draft EIS and final EIS are complied with. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-400, -550 (1977).
The Port Townsend guidelines ordinance, which adopted most of the Guidelines verbatim, implicitly
designated the city engineer as the responsible official when the city is the lead agency. PORT TOWNSEND, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 19.04.060(2), (4) (Supp. 1980).
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mental problems that could result from its proposed use of the property. 9
After Safeway revised its plan to correct the potential problems, it submitted a written application for a building permit on October 14, 1977.
The city engineer promptly issued a proposed negative threshold determination;1 0 three weeks later on November 7, 1977, despite opposition from
townspeople,"1 he issued a final negative threshold determination. 12 Safe3
way received a building permit shortly thereafter. '
A group of townspeople filed suit on December 6, 1977, challenging
both the rezone and the issuance of Safeway's building permit. The trial
court dismissed the complaint after a four-day trial. It held that the challenge to the rezone was barred by laches because the suit had not been
filed until more than nine months after the rezone had been approved. The
court also held that the negative threshold determination met the procedural safeguards provided by the State Environmental Policy Act
14
(SEPA).
9. The major problem anticipated by the city engineer was traffic congestion. Letter from Roger
French, responsible SEPA official, to Safeway, Swains, the original property owner, and public officials involved (May 12, 1977) (on file with the WashingtonLawReview).
Two of the plaintiffs wrote to the Safeway real estate manager on August 20, 1977, enumerating
several concerns, including water pollution from oil run-off from the parking lot and aesthetic blight.
Similar concerns were expressed by other plaintiffs in a letter to the editor of the Port Townsend
Leader on August 11, 1977, at 4 (on file with the Washington Law Review).
10. The negative threshold determination, also called a "declaration of nonsignificance," is the
"written decision by the responsible official of the lead agency that a proposal will not have a significant adverse environmental impact and that therefore no environmental impact statement is required." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(9) (1977). See notes 59-75 and accompanying text
infra.
The proposed threshold determination should be completed within 15 days of the submission of the
environmental checklist. WASH. ADMN. CODE § 197-10-305 (1977); PORT TOWNSEND, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 19.04.040(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1980).
11. The City Engineer received dozens of letters from Port Townsend residents who objected to
this proposed negative threshold determination and requested that he reconsider the determination.
Letters from Port Townsend residents (Oct. 25-31, 1977) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
The SEPA Guidelines require only that "[i]f comments are received, the lead agency shall reconsider
its proposed declaration; however, the lead agency is not required to modify its proposed declaration
of nonsignificance to reflect the comments received." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-340(5)
(1977); PORT TOWNSEND, WASH., MUNCn'AL CODE § 19.04.020 (Supp. 1980). These letters did not
have the effect desired by their authors. Mr. Glenn Abraham, the city attorney, commented: "[M]y
recollection of the letters . . . is that they did not request any explanations; but were primarily
devoted to either critical remarks or were intended to demonstrate the superior intellect of the
writer." Letter from Glenn Abraham to author (Nov. 24, 1980) (on file with the Washington Law
Review).
12. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 874, 613 P.2d 1164, 1166 (1980). The
SEPA official followed guideline procedures. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-340 (1977).
13. The Hayden court did not indicate precisely when the building permit was issued. 93 Wn. 2d
at 874, 613 P.2d at 1167. The court did not need to be more precise because the time lapse between
the issuance of the building permit and the filing of suit was not at issue in the laches question.
14. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, No. 9220 (Jefferson County Super. Ct., June 20, 1978).
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The appeal was transferred from the court of appeals to the supreme
court. 15 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that the facts
supported the defense of laches; however, it held that laches should not be
used to avoid addressing the merits of an environmental issue which concerned the entire community. 16 The court also held that the plaintiffs'
15. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 613 P.2d 1164 (1980). Under WASH.
REV. CODE § 2.06.030(d) (1979), "cases involving fundamental and urgent issues of broad public
import requiring prompt and ultimate determination" should be transferred from the court of appeals
to the supreme court. See also WASH. R. App. P. 4.3 (1980) (allows for transfers which "promote the
orderly administration ofjustice. ")
16. Hayden, 93 Wn. 2d at 876, 613 P.2d at 1168. The plaintiffs could have focused their challenge solely on the building permit and probably avoided the laches issue because they filed suit
within one month after Safeway obtained the building permit. But see State ex rel. Morrison v. City
of Seattle, 6 Wn. App. 181, 185-86, 492 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1971) (The court accepted without
qualification the trial court's dictum that a delay of 20 days by the plaintiffs after the defendant's
purchase of the land in controversy raised the laches defense. The plaintiff in Morrison was fully
aware that the defendant had options to buy the property.). For a discussion of why the court's use of
the laches defense in an environmental case might depend on the particular plaintiff's situation, see
note 56 infra.
The plaintiffs in Hayden included the challenge to the rezone for pragmatic, political reasons. A
building permit EIS would not have been as useful to the plaintiffs as a rezone EIS. The Guidelines
strictly limit the content of an EIS for a project such as Safeway's:
When the proposal is for a private project on a specific site, the alternatives considered shall be
limited to the "no-action" alternative plus other reasonable alternative means of achieving the
objective of the proposal on the same site or other sites owned or controlled by the same proponent ....

WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-440(12)(e) (1977). Because Safeway's proposal was a "private
project on a specific site," the alternatives which the building permit EIS could address were severely
limited by this section. The same section establishes that an EIS of the rezone is not subject to these
limitations: "This limitation shall not apply when the project proponent is applying for a rezone .... ." Id. As a result, with a rezone EIS the public could request consideration of any reasonable alternative in the draft of the EIS. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-440(12)(a) (1977). In a
case decided on the same day as Hayden, the supreme court demonstrated the distinction between the
content of an EIS for a rezone and one for a private project on a specific site. After quoting WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-440(12) (1977) (excerpted in pertinent part above), the court held that the
limitation on the private project EIS was not applicable to an EIS for a rezone. Barrie v. Kitsap
County, 93 Wn. 2d 843, 854-56, 613 P.2d 1148, 1155-56 (1980).
The Barrie court also emphasized that the purpose of WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-440(12)(a)
not the
was to allow the county to study "other means of achieving the count's objective ....
[project proponent's]." Id. at 856, 613 P.2d at 1156. In Barrie, the county objective "apparently"
was a regional shopping center. Id. In Hayden, the City of Port Townsend does not appear to have
had such a clear objective. The trial court noted the city's uncertainty: "After all of the studies made
over the years about use of the lagoon area, the Council was faced with some sort of decision. The
situation had reached the point where as we used to say in the military 'Let's do something even if it's
right.' " Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, No. 9220 (Jefferson County Super. Ct., June 20, 1978).
Because the City of Port Townsend did not have as specific an objective as did the county in Barrie,
the reasonable alternatives which could have been addressed in the rezone EIS would have been
broader; arguably such alternatives could have included noncommercial development such as a park.
Then, if this park alternative had been discussed in the rezone EIS, the city council might have been
less reluctant to reject Safeway's proposal.
In short, the plaintiffs wanted to broaden the range of options to include noncommercial development. Safeway wanted to limit the council's options to commercial development or the politically
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challenge to the negative threshold determination was without merit. 17 In
reaching this conclusion, the court "accorded substantial weight" 18 to
the local government's decision and applied the clearly erroneous standard of review. 19 The court commended the city engineer for his "eminently sensible" 20 procedure of discussing with Safeway the environmental problems he discovered during his review of the environmental
checklist and then allowing the store an opportunity to alter plans before
21
submitting its formal building permit application.
The court's rulings on the laches defense and the negative threshold
determination represent significant departures from the court's previous
unpopular "no-action" alternative. Safeway's tool to limit the range of options was WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-10-440(12)(e) (1977). The noncommercial options could best be researched and developed in an EIS at the rezone stage; consequently, plaintiffs' efforts to present the city council with
noncommercial alternatives would be severely hampered if the property was not subjected to a second
rezone process. For this reason, the issue of the validity of the rezone process was of critical tactical
importance to both parties.
17. Laches was raised as a defense to both complaints: the rezone approved nine months earlier
and the more recent approval of the building permit application. The court refused to consider laches
as a defense to the more recent building permit process. The discussion of laches in the opinion and
this note relates only to the earlier rezone process. See note 16 supra.
18. Hayden, 93 Wn. 2d at 880, 613 P.2d at 1170 (1980) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §
43.21C.090 (1979)).
19. Id. The clearly erroneous standard of review of agency decision-making is preferred by
Washington commentators. In several earlier decisions, including the leading case of Norway Hill
Preservation Council v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 274, 552 P.2d 674, 678 (1976), the
court used two standards of review: clearly erroneous and arbitrary and capricious. For criticism of
the court's use of the two standards of review, see Abrahams, Scope of Review of Administrative
Action in Washington: A Proposal, 14 GONz. L. REv. 75, 185-87 (1978) (standard of review in
Norway Hill criticized as illogical and a misapplication of the arbitrary and capricious standard) and
Andersen, Judicial Review of Agency FactFinding in Washington, 13 WILLAMETr L. REV. 397,
409-10 (1977) (recent decisions suggest that Washington courts have relaxed the strictness of review, contrary to the legislature's intent). See generally Note, JudicialReview of FederalActions
under § 102(2)(c) of NEPA: The CaseforReasonableness, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 866 (1975) (review de
novo is in keeping with purpose of NEPA); Note, Threshold DeterminationsunderNEPA, 16 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 107 (1975) (possible standard of review includes arbitrary and capricious, substantial
evidence, reasonable basis, review de novo, and reasonableness; the author prefers reasonableness).
20. Hayden, 93 Wn. 2d at 880, 613 P.2d at 1170.
21. Although the city engineer, the responsible SEPA official, is responsible for the supervision
or actual preparation of the EIS, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-200 (1977), he can require the
applicant to write it. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-100(4) (1977). Hence, it was in Safeway's
interest to avoid the EIS requirement if only to avoid the expense of preparing the statement. The Port
Townsend Municipal Code requires the applicant to pay all costs connected with complying with
SEPA. PORT TOWNSEND, WASH. MUNICIPAL CODE § 19.04.104 (Supp. 1980). The corresponding
provision in the Guidelines neither authorizes nor forbids imposing SEPA costs on applicants. WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-860 (1977).
It was in Safeway's interest to avoid the EIS requirement for other reasons as well. First, the
preparation time would delay the commencement of construction and extend the period of unproductive use of the property. Second, the intricacies of EIS preparation would provide more opportunities
for the plaintiffs to object, whether reasonably or unreasonably, to violations of procedural or substantive matters connected with the preparation of the document, leading to further expense and delay.
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decisions. This note will examine the changes in the court's positions and

discuss the effect of these changes on future environmental litigation.
II.

THE LACHES DOCTRINE

A.

Background

Laches 22 is an equitable defense which, if proved, will cause a court to
dismiss a case. Laches has been applied by Washington courts since
189423 and is invoked when the defendant proves three elements. The

defendant must show:
22. Pomeroy defined the doctrine of laches as "such neglect or omission to assert a right as,
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity." 2 J. POMEROY, TREATISE ON
EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 419, at 171-72 (5th ed. 1941) (quoting Am. & ENG. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF

LAW 97 (2d ed. 1910)). This definition explicitly includes two of the three elements of laches enunciated by the Supreme Court of Washington before Hayden: (1) an unwarranted delay by the plaintiff in
bringing the action, and (2) prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. See note 25 and accompanying text infra. These basic elements of laches have been accepted for over 100 years. See Castner
v. Walrod, 83 11. 171 (1876); Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, L.R. 5 P.C. 221 (1874).
For recent discussions of laches, see Comment, Application of the Doctrines of Laches in Public
Interest Litigation, 56 B.U.L. REV. 181 (1976) (a "'good" laches defense may be ignored to further
public interests) and Note, Administrative Law-Enforcement of Zoning Regulations-Laches: A
Bar where Failureto Enforce RegulationResults in SubstantialPrejudice,22 How. L.J. 513 (1979)
(although historically the doctrine of laches has not been enforced against municipalities which delay
in enforcing a zoning requirement, this case suggests that courts may be less willing to abide municipalities' inefficiency and inaction).
23. Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 37 P. 297 (1894).
Laches has been raised as a defense in Washington in the following types of cases:
(1) charges of fraudulent handling of stock, Stewart v. Johnston, 30 Wn. 2d 925, 195 P.2d
119 (1948);
(2) bonds, Amende v. Pierce County, 70 Wn. 2d 391, 423 P.2d 634 (1967);
(3) building association funds, Conaway v. Co-operative Homebuilders, 65 Wash. 39, 117 P.
716 (1911);
(4) cancellation of a mortgage, Anderson Estate, Inc. v. Hoffman, 171 Wash. 378, 18 P.2d 5
(1933);
(5) interference with riparian rights, Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 37
P. 297 (1894);
(6) alteration of a deed, Chezum v. McBride, 21 Wash. 558, 58 P. 1067 (1899):
(7) sale of property, Shew v. Coon Bay Loafers, Inc., 76 Wn. 2d 40, 455 P.2d 359 (1969):
(8) complaints of mishandling probate funds, Rutter v. Rutter, 59 Wn. 2d 781, 370 P.2d 862
(1962); Marsh v. Merrick, 28 Wn. App. 156 (1981);
(9) adverse possession, Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wn. 2d 143, 449 P.2d 800 (1968);
(10) discharge of police officer, Luellen v. City of Aberdeen, 20 Wn. 2d 594. 148 P.2d 849
(1944);
(11) landlord-tenant rent surcharge dispute, Panorama Residential Protective Ass'n v. Panorama Corp. of Wash., 28 Wn. App. 923 (1981);
(12) challenges to various municipal actions:
a. utility assessment, Pratt v. Water Dist. No. 79, 58 Wn. 2d 420, 363 P.2d 816
(1961);
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(1) the plaintiff knew he had a cause of action;
(2) the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing suit; and
(3) the defendant was prejudiced by that delay. 24
The availability of the defense in cases involving the public interest has
been the subject of a number of conflicting Washington Supreme Court
rulings.
In 1928, the Washington Supreme Court decided in State ex rel. Mason
v. Boardof County CommissionersofKing County25 that laches was not a
defense in cases affecting public interests. Mason involved a redistricting
proposal in King County which favored county voters over Seattle voters. 26 The court did not bar the suit even though the plaintiffs had delayed
almost four months after the redistricting resolution was adopted, and appeals were required by statute to be brought within twenty days. 27 The
court refused to apply laches because the matter was "one of public concern and public right.' '28
In 1974, the supreme court appeared to abandon the sweeping Mason
rule in a case involving the placement of an interstate highway. A plurality of the court in Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State
Highway Commission29 discussed the approach of other jurisdictions
which "sought to balance the public interest in the outcome of the suit
against the harm caused by the delay in bringing suit.' '30 The Leschi court
b. county construction bids, Reiner v. Clarke County, 137 Wash. 194, 241 P. 973
(1926);
c. enforcement of Open Meetings Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.30 (1979),
Lopp v. Peninsula School Dist., 90 Wn. 2d 754, 585 P.2d 801 (1978);
d. special levy election, LaVergne v. Boysen, 82 Wn. 2d 718,513 P.2d 547 (1973);
e. redistricting, State ex rel. Mason v. Board of County Comm'rs of King County, 146
Wash. 449, 263 P. 735 (1928), overruled by Lopp v. Peninsula School Dist., 90 Wn. 2d
754, 585 P.2d 801 (1978);
f. zoning, Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971);
g. environmental concerns, Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn.
2d 475, 513 P.2d 361 (1973).
For a review of early Washington cases that apply laches, see 6 WASH. L. REv. 91 (1931).
The supreme court discusses several laches cases in McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wn. 2d 391,
401-03, 143 P.2d 307, 312-13 (1943).
24. Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wn. 2d 518, 522, 495 P.2d 1358, 1361 (1972). These traditional
elements are rephrased only slightly in Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 874-75,
613 P.2d 1164, 1167 (1980).
25. 146 Wash. 449, 263 P. 735 (1928).
26. Id. at 452, 263 P. at 736.
27. The court rejected a statute of limitations defense because the plaintiffs were not permitted to
appeal the resolution. Appeals could "be prosecuted only by one who was a party to the proceedings
before the board," and the plaintiff was not a party. Id. at 454-55, 263 P. at 737. Since the plaintiff
had no remedy by appeal, he was not bound by the 20 day limitation.
28. Id. at 455, 263 P. at 737.
29. 84 Wn. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974). For a discussion of Leschi, see note 46 infra.
30. Id. at 275,525 P.2d at 779 (emphasis added).
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emphasized the Fourth Circuit case of Arlington Coalitionon Transportation v. Volpe, 31 where the only reason that court did not apply laches was
that the costs of altering or abandoning this public 32 project did not yet
outweigh the benefits of considering environmental concerns.33 The Leschi court did not expressly adopt the Arlington Coalition balancing approach, 34 but the court's discussion of a balancing of interests in considering the laches defense indicated the court's willingness to deviate from
the Mason rule and allow laches as a defense in cases involving the "public concern."
The indication in Leschi that the court preferred a balancing test even in
cases involving the "public concern" proved correct in 1978, when the
court overruled Mason in Lopp v. Peninsula School District.35 In Lopp,
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the sale of school bonds because of an alleged violation of the Open Public Meetings Act. 36 The plaintiff had delayed six weeks before bringing suit. The court held that laches should be
available as a defense in cases affecting the public interest. It stated,
"[t]he nature of the lawsuit, here a public interest lawsuit, is simply another factor to be considered by the court in determining whether the doctrine of laches should be applied." 37 The court concluded that the "balancing approach [noted in Leschi] is more logical" 38 and applied this
approach to the facts of the case. Because the plaintiff had delayed for six
weeks, and the school district would be harmed financially, the court held
39
that the plaintiff's action was barred by laches.
Before Hayden, then, one of the considerations the court used to determine whether laches should be applied was the nature of the case. The
earlier Mason rule, that the laches defense was not available in cases involving the public interest, 40 was overruled by Lopp. In its place, the

31. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
32. The Arlington Coalition court did not indicate what weight it gave to the fact that this was a
public, not a private, project. For a discussion of how public and private projects might be distinguished in this context in Washington, see notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra.
33. The Arlington Coalition court indicated that it would apply laches when the project had progressed to the point where the costs of altering or abandoning it did outweigh the benefits of considering potential environmental problems. 458 F.2d at 1330.
34. The Leschi plurality's discussion of laches is unclear. For a discussion of this lack of clarity,
see note 46 infra.
35. 90 Wn.2d 754,585 P.2d 801 (1978).
36. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 42.30 (1979).
37. 90 Wn. 2d at 759, 585 P.2d at 804.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 761-62, 585 P.2d at 805.
40. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
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Lopp court adhered to the balancing approach discussed in Leschi;41 the
public interest was "simply another factor" 4 2 for the court to balance.
B.

The Hayden Decision

The Hayden court found that the three traditional elements of laches
were established by the defendants. 43 Despite this finding, the court refused to apply laches because the case presented an environmental question which concerned the entire community. 44 Thus, in a case with an
environmental question, the court has added another step to establishing
laches.
Although the Hayden court cited Lopp, 45 it did not consider the nature
of the case as simply another element to be balanced, 46 but as an element
41.
42.
43.

See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
Lopp, 90 Wn. 2d at 759, 585 P.2d at 804.
Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 874-76, 613 P.2d 1164, 1167-68

(1980).
44. Id. at 876, 613 P.2d at 1168.
45. Id.
46. In Lopp v. Peninsula School Dist., 90 Wn. 2d 754, 759, 585 P.2d 801,804 (1978), the court
expressly approved of the case-by-case approach to the laches question that the court described in
Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271,275, 525 P.2d
774, 779 (1974). The issue in Leschi was a challenge under SEPA and WASH. REV. CODE ch. 47.52
(Public Highways-Limited Access Facilities) of procedures followed in a hearing on the limited
access and design of Interstate Highway 90 between the west shore of Mercer Island and Seattle. 84
Wn. 2d at 272, 525 P.2d at 777. The Leschi court noted the approach taken in Arlington Coalition on
Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972), where the court
"sought to balance the public interest in the outcome of the suit against the harm caused by delay in
bringing the suit." 84 Wn. 2d at 275,525 P.2d at 779.
The issue before the court in Arlington Coalition, as in Leschi, was the placement of an interstate
highway. The plaintiffs in Arlington Coalition delayed almost 14 months before bringing suit. The
court indicated that it would permit the laches defense to bar the plaintiffs' claim only when the
project had "progressed to the point where the costs of altering or abandoning the proposed route
would certainlyoutweigh the benefits that might accrue therefrom to the general public." 458 F.2d at
1330. The court determined that the project in Arlington Coalition had not yet progressed to that
point. Id. at 1329-30. The Leschi court apparently approved of this balancing approach, a predictable result under SEPA.
The Leschi court's view of the role of laches in environmental litigation is unclear in part because
the issue is discussed only by a plurality of the court. A more significant reason, however, for the lack
of clarity in the laches discussion is the plurality's casual treatment of the issue. The plurality interrupts a discussion of standing to insert two paragraphs on laches. After this insertion, the standing
discussion resumes. 84 Wn. 2d at 274-75, 525 P.2d at 778-79. The laches insertion is tangential to
the discussion of standing. Further, the insert discusses laches only in a general way, without relating
it to the Leschi case. Since the plurality emphasizes the balancing approach of ArlingtonCoalition, it
probably meant to suggest that it would adopt this approach when faced with that issue; however,
until Lopp, where the court did follow Arlington Coalition, this was mere conjecture. For a discussion of Lopp, see notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
Lopp reiterated the Leschi position that the public interest is not elevated to a special status in
making these balancing decisions. 90 Wn. 2d at 759, 585 P.2d at 804. The Leschi-Lopp approach is
superseded by the Hayden changes. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text infra.
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which could totally override the others. The court explained: "We are
reluctant to rest a decision in an environmental matter affecting an entire
community on laches .... [T]o estop a community from challenging that
action . . .causes us some hesitation. 47 The court hesitated to apply

laches because of several practical problems a plaintiff might face in environmental litigation. The plaintiff's delay could be caused by an administrative problem such as organizing the protest, raising money, or finding
an attorney. The court recognized that in determining whether a plaintiff's delay has been excessive, a developer's ability to move quickly
should not be compared to a plaintiff's administrative inability to move
quickly.48

C.

Analysis

The laches discussion in Hayden focused on the nature of the case.
Specifically, the court established that in the future the trial court must
determine whether the environmental effects of a project are of such
widespread concern to the public and have such an impact on the environment that the merits of the case should be reached, even though the traditional elements of the laches defense are present. The sole reason the
Hayden court refused to apply laches was the widespread concern over
49
the environmental issue.
The Hayden court neither explained the rationale for departing from the
Lopp balancing approach nor indicated how the two cases should be reconciled. While Hayden does not overrule Lopp expressly, Lopp does not
survive Hayden fully intact. The Hayden court created an exception to the
Lopp balancing test for those environmental issues which have potentially
broad impact. 50 This restriction on the application of laches must be examined more closely.
47.
48.
49.

Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn.2d 870, 876, 613 P.2d 1164, 1168 (1980).
Id.
Id.

50. In creating this exception to the Lopp balancing test, Hayden seems to revive Mason in part.
The Mason exception to the laches defense was for matters "of public concern and public right."
State ex rel Mason v. Board of County Comm'rs of King County, 146 Wash. 449, 455, 263 P. 735,
737 (1928), overruled by Lopp v. Peninsula School Dist., 90 Wn. 2d 754, 585 P.2d 801 (1978). See

notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra. The Hayden exception is not so broadly phrased; it concems "environmental matter[s] affecting an entire community." 93 Wn.2d at 376, 613 P.2d at 1168
(emphasis added). Thus, Hayden does not encompass the range of public concerns which Mason did.
Indeed, the concern in Mason-election redistricting-is not within Hayden's compass.
Furthermore, the Hayden exception is not phrased as strongly as that of Mason. The Hayden court
wrote, "[W]e are reluctant to rest a decision in an environmental matter affecting an entire community on laches." Id. (emphasis added). The Hayden court's use of the word "reluctant" suggests that
the court has not determined the contours of the partial revival of Mason, and that there may be

Threshold Determination/Laches
One distinction between Lopp and Hayden, the identity of the defendants, suggests a possible limit on the Hayden approach to laches analysis. In Lopp, the defendant was a public body, a school district. By allowing the laches defense, the court enabled the general public in that school
district to retain the benefit of a favorable bond issue. 5 1 In Hayden, the
two defendants with substantial financial interests were private businesses. 52 Consequently, the court's decision not to allow the laches defense did not subject the general public to direct financial loss. 53 This
difference suggests that in an environmental suit where public funds are
directly involved, the court might follow Lopp and examine the nature of
the case.
Furthermore, language in the Hayden opinion suggests that this restriction to laches would not apply in all environmental suits. -The court stated:
"Often what is everybody's business is nobody's business." 54 Although
this adage is vague and therefore difficult to apply, it suggests that the

court is taking judicial notice of a quality of human nature: people will not
get involved in a controversy if they think their interests will be upheld by
others. The court implicity recognized that delay by a plaintiff in an environmental protest was likely when the project proposal did not affect an
identifiable group in a unique or particularly odious way. People will be
slower to support a cause that does not directly protect a personal interest.
Given these assumptions, if an environmental action did affect someone
directly, the court might be more willing to apply laches because that
person should have known to respond more punctually. 55 The fact that a
situations in which the court will not impose laches in an "environmental matter affecting an entire
community." For a discussion of an example of how the court might make this decision, see note 46
supra.
The 1981 Washington Legislature threatened to restrict the court's ability to define further the
contours of the Hayden exception with legislation which would have severely restricted judicial review of SEPA compliance. For a discussion of this ultimately unsuccessful legislative effort, see note
108 infra.
51. Lopp v. Peninsula School Dist., 90 Wn.2d 754,761,585 P.2d 801, 805 (1978).
52. Safeway Stores, Inc. and Swains. The third defendant, the City of Port Townsend, was
keenly interested in the outcome of the case, but it did not have an identifiable, direct financial interest at stake. Hayden, 93 Wn. 2d at 872, 613 P.2d at 1165-66.
53. Clearly the Port Townsend public would pay for at least some of the cost generated by the
delay imposed on Safeway in the form of higher prices. It is likely, however, that the losses on this
particular misadventure would be distributed throughout the nationwide grocery chain, spreading the
cost among more people and decreasing the size of the burden which would be borne by Port Townsend residents.
54. 93 Wn. 2d at 876, 613 P.2d at 1168.
55. One commentator concluded that under the National Environmental Policy Act, prospective
environmental plaintiffs must act quickly to protect against a laches defense. Note, Laches Bars
Environmentalists' Challenge, 19 NAT. REsouRces J. 929, 930 (1979). This conclusion is based on a
federal district court case, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 467 F. Supp. 885 (N.D.
Miss. 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 316 (1980), but it is not sup-
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developer promptly began a project may not shield him from a somewhat
belated protest from a citizen's group, given the Hayden court's under56
standing of the problems such groups traditionally face.
While the Hayden limit to laches is a gain for environmentalists, it will
not prove decisive in their struggle against developers' environmental insensitivity. Developers have another means of preventing environmental
suits. The State Environmental Policy Act provides that once the developer has obtained the approval to proceed, she can at her option give
notice of her plans and thereby commence the running of a thirty-day
period during which any environmental challenge must be brought or be
barred. 57 Because the laches defense has been circumscribed by the Hayden court, developers will probably make more use of this statutory pro58
vision to foreclose litigation.

ported by the facts of the case. In Alexander, the plaintiffs had waited nine years to challenge the
widening of a channel in a navigation project on which $600 million of the estimated $I billion total
cost had already been spent. Clearly plaintiff's delay was excessive and defendant's potential loss,
without the protection of laches, was also excessive.
56. The court may be less tolerant of delays by a more organized group. One such group, the
United South Slopes Residents (USSR) on Queen Anne Hill in Seattle, was involved in the landmark
decision in 1978 forbidding the construction of a high-rise apartment building at the foot of Queen
Anne Hill. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn. 2d 59, 62, 578 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1978). If a
future threat to the interests of the USSR arises, this organized group would not face all of the difficulties the Hayden court enumerated. This and similarly situated groups should be expected to respond more quickly to threats to its interests than should a group of citizens responding for the first
time to a common threat.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.080 (1979). According to Mr. Peter Buck, past chairman of the
Washington Bar Association Land Use and Environmental Law Section, this provision "has been
used fairly frequently by developers, both before and after Hayden. I am not aware that Hayden has
made a difference in anyone's thoughts on this. It is not always used, however, since developers
simply are not aware of it." Mr. Buck doubts that utilizing the provision draws attention to a project
and invites litigation. Letter from Peter Buck to author (Feb. 19, 1981) (on file with the Washington
Law Review). This view is at odds with the conclusions of Mr. Dale Foreman, a Wenatchee attorney.
Mr. Foreman claims: "The provision was the product of intense lobbying efforts by financial institutions and other commercial and development interests" to put to rest the fear that environmentalists
would use SEPA to tie up major projects through protracted litigation. Foreman, Cutting Off Challenges Under SEPA, in 1979 Washington State Bar Convention Reference Notebook for Legal Institutes, 927. The provision is not used more frequently because "you [i.e., the developer] .. .give
notice to the world of your project and invite a lawsuit. . . .Whether to use [WASH. REV. CODE §
43.21C].080 depends in large part on the strength, resources and continuity of the potential opposition." Id. at 929.
58. The plaintiffs in Hayden raised an issue with regard to this provision. They argued that because the defendants could use the SEPA statute of limitations to foreclose all challenges to their
developments, the defendants should not be allowed to use the equitable defense of laches as well.
Brief for Appellants at 19-22, Hayden v. Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 613 P.2d 1164 (1980).
The court did not address this issue.
The plaintiffs argued persuasively that "[Ilimiting SEPA limitation defenses to the statutory provisions of RCW 43.21 C.080 is consistent with the rule that 'equitable relief is not available if there is a
plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.' " Id. at 21 (citing Smith v. Smith, 4 Wn. App. 608,

Threshold Determination/Laches
D.

Summary

The scope of the Hayden restriction on the laches defense is not yet
clear. After Hayden, plaintiffs in similar cases will have less reason to
fear the successful application of laches against them. However, given
the statutory provision which enables a developer to preclude protest after
a specified period, developers will be able to lessen the impact on this
gain for environmentalists.
III.
A.

THE THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
Background

The chief purpose of the State Environmental Policy Act59 is to prevent
environmental damage caused by land development. 60 The Act's most
613, 484 P.2d 409, 412 (1971)). Although Smith involved a property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree, 4 Wn. App. at 609, 484 P.2d at 410, the general principle applies in
Hayden.
The SEPA statute of limitations has been invoked successfully in recent years. It barred a claim of
inverse condemnation brought two years after the defendant published a "Notice of Action" in Dunstan v. City of Seattle, 24 Wn. App. 265, 600 P.2d 674 (1979), review denied, 93 Wn. 2d 1013
(1980).
The court of appeals held recently that WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.080 does not apply to proponents of an agency action. Oden Investment Co. v. City of Seattle, 28 Wn. App. 161, 622 P.2d 882
(1981). Oden, the project proponent, wanted to take advantage of the SEPA statute of limitations
because it was longer than the appeal period provided by the city ordinance. Relying heavily on the
trial court's reasoning, the Oden court found that WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.080 "is primarily a
means of providing constructive notice to the populace at large" and is the means "of putting to a
resolute end protests against the proposed project." 28 Wn. App. at 164-65, 622 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added). The court concluded: "Because the parties involved will necessarily have had notice,
it makes no sense to extend the length of time within which they can seek review to the time allowed
to those [third parties] with only constructive notice." Id. at 165, 622 P.2d at 884. The court's view
assumes that the policy behind the constructive notice is to put an end to citizen interference in the
decision-making process. The court does not discuss a second policy behind the provision: to give
actual as well as constructive notice to interested parties. Indeed, in Oden, the United South Slopes
Residents (USSR) on Queen Anne Hill, an organized citizens group, became involved in the litigation at an early stage, a demonstration of this second policy. Id. at 163,622 P.2d at 883.
For a discussion of the USSR, see note 56 supra.
59. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 43.21C (1979).
60. The full statement of the purpose of SEPA is set out in WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.010
(1979):
The purposes of this chapter are: (1) to declare a state policy which will encourage a productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; (2) to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere; (3) and stimulate the health and
welfare of man; and (4) to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the state and nation.
The court of appeals called SEPA "the State of Washington's most fundamental expression of environmental policy." Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 63,
510 P.2d 1140, 1144, review denied, 83 Wn. 2d 1002 (1973).
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important tool 61 for evaluating the potential environmental effects of a
proposed project is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), a detailed
report compiled before the start of the project. 62 An EIS must be compiled "for legislation and other major actions 63 significantly affecting the
65
quality of the environment.' '64 The decision by the "lead agency"
whether to require preparation of an EIS is called the "threshold determination." 66 With two exceptions not pertinent to Hayden, 67 a threshold
61. See Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 68, 510 P.2d
1140, 1146 (1973) (describing the EIS as "particularly important").
62. The EIS is described in WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1979):
(2) all branches of government of this state, including ...municipal... corporations... shall:
(c) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in
the proposed action should it be implemented;
63. A governmental act which is "discretionary and nonduplicative" is a major action for purposes of SEPA. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 491, 513 P.2d
36, 46 (1973). A "major action" is any "action" not exempted by the Guidelines. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-10-040(24) (1977). One of the three subcategories of "action" listed in the Guidelines
is "[glovernmental licensing of activities involving modification of the physical environment."
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(2)(a) (1977).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1979). If a series of projects, considered cumulatively, constitutes a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment, an EIS must
be prepared at the outset. Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wn. App. 156, 164, 612
P.2d 430, 435 (1980).
65. The lead agency is defined by the Guidelines. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-200 to 270,
345 (1977). "The lead agency is responsible for making the threshold determination and preparing or
supervising preparation of the draft and final environmental impact statements." WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-10-040(19) (1977). The City of Port Townsend was the lead agency and the city engineer was the city's designated SEPA official. The SEPA official's duty is to advise the lead agency,
leaving the final decision to that body. D.E.B.T., Ltd. v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs, 24
Wn. App. 136, 140-41, 600 P.2d 628, 632 (1979).
66. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(33) (1977). Prior to the enactment of the SEPA Guidelines in 1976, the Washington Court of Appeals introduced the concept of the negative threshold
determination in Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d
1140, review denied, 83 Wn. 2d 1002 (1973):
[SEPA] necessarily requires the consideration of environmental factors [before determining]
whether or not an Environmental Impact Statement must be prepared. Thus, SEPA requires that
a decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement must be based upon a determination that the proposed project is not a major action significantly affecting the quality of the
environment. . . .[The lead agency] must be able to demonstrate that environmental factors
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determination must be made for every proposed major action. 68 If the
lead agency determines that a proposal will not have a significant adverse
impact 69 on the environment, it issues a negative threshold determina70
tion.
The SEPA Guidelines set forth the procedures the lead agency 71 must
follow when making a threshold determination. First, the project proponent must complete an environmental checklist. 72 If the checklist contains
sufficient information from which the lead agency can determine the environmental impact of the proposal, it then makes a threshold determination. 73 If the agency needs further information before making a decision,
the Guidelines authorize the agency to demand more information from the
applicant, conduct further studies itself, or consult with other agencies
that have expertise in the field. 74 The Guidelines do not authorize the
were considered in a manner sufficient to amount to prima facie compliance with the procedural
requirements of SEPA.
Id. at 73, 510 P.2d at 1149. The Washington Supreme Court adopted the JuanitaBay concept of the
negative threshold determination in Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County
Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 272-73, 552 P.2d 674, 677-78 (1976). The court later wrote: "This
It must precede
threshold determination is critical for full implementation of SEPA's mandate ....
governmental action.... mhe policy of the act [is] thwarted when the governmental body fails to
make any threshold determination whatsoever." Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wn. 2d 804,
813-14, 576 P.2d 54, 59 (1978).
67. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-300(2) (1977) provides:
The threshold determination requirement may be omitted when: (a) Both the responsible official
and the sponsor (public or private) of a proposal agree that an EIS is required, or (b) The sponsor of the proposal and the lead agency are the same entity and decides that an EIS is required.
68. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-300(1) (1977).
69. The Washington Supreme Court adopted initially a federal court's definition of "significant
impact":
The use of the term "significantly" has been defined to include the examination of at least two
relevant factors: (1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in
excess of those created by existing uses in the area, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse
environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its
contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area.
Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416, 423, 526 P.2d 897, 902 (1974)
(quoting Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972)). Later, in Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976), the Washington court adopted a slightly different definition of "significant impact": "whenever more than a
moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonableprobability." 87 Wn. 2d at 278,
552 P.2d at 680 (emphasis added). See notes 82-85 and accompanying text infra.
70. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-340(1) (1977). See generally note 66 supra.
In Hayden v. City of PortTownsend, the city council made separate negative threshold determinations before approving the rezone application and the building permit. 93 Wn. 2d 870, 873-74, 613
P.2d 1164, 1167-70 (1980).
71. For a discussion of the duties of the lead agency, see note 8 supra.
72. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-310(1) (1977).
73. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 197-10-330(2) (1977).
74. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-330(1) (1977) lists the three ways the agency can supplement the environmental checklist: (a) the lead agency can require the applicant to furnish further
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agency to inform a project proponent of revisions required before a proj75
ect can be given a negative threshold determination.
Environmental litigation often focuses on the language in SEPA that
triggers the EIS requirement: Is the proposal a major action "significantly
affecting the quality of the environment" ?76 In Norway Hill Preservation
& ProtectionAssociation v. King County Council,77 the Washington Supreme Court addressed this question in reviewing the King County Council's approval of a preliminary plat application for a housing subdivision
without first requiring an EIS. 78 The council had given its approval subject to conditions recommended to it by the Land Use Management Division of the County Department of Planning. 79 The court described the
proposed project as one which would "transform a heavily wooded and
unpopulated area into a residential suburban neighborhood." 80
In order to resolve the dispute in Norway Hill, the court first interpreted
the statutory term "significant. ' 8 1 Initially, the court cautioned that "a
precise and workable definition is elusive because judgments in this area
are particularly subjective-what to one person may constitute a significant or adverse effect on the quality of the environment may be of little or
no consequence to another." 82 The court then noted that SEPA was enacted to give full consideration to environmental values in government
decision-making. 83 The court consequently set forth the following staninformation on topics covered in the environmental checklist; (b) the lead agency may conduct further
studies, including on-site investigations, of the impact of the proposal; and (c) the lead agency can
consult with other agencies with jurisdiction when those other agencies have expertise in the matter
discussed.
75. For the provisions governing threshold determination procedures, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 197-10-300 to 400 (1977).
The Guidelines provide for the proponent to modify his proposal in certain circumstances:
If at any time after the issuance of a declaration of significance, the proponent modifies the
proposal so that, in the judgment of the lead agency, all significant adverse impacts which might
result are eliminated, the declaration of significance shall be withdrawn and a declaration of
nonsignificance issued instead.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-370 (1977). This provision does not cover the Hayden situation,
where Safeway modified its project before the issuance of a declaration of significance. Safeway's
modifications were in response to a series of meetings held between May 6, 1977, when the store
submitted its environmental checklist, and October 14, 1977, when it submitted the building permit
application. (Letters pertaining to those meetings are on file with the Washington Law Review.) The
city engineer issued the proposed negative threshold determination later, on October 17. 1977.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1979).
77. 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
78. Id. at 268-69, 552 P.2d at 675.
79. Id. at 270-71, 552 P.2d at 676.
80. Id. at 278, 552 P.2d at 680.
81. Id. at 276-78, 552 P.2d at 680-81. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1979),
reprinted in part in note 62 supra.
82. 87 Wn. 2d. at 277,552 P.2d at 680.
83. Id. at 277-78, 552 P.2d at 680. For the purposes of SEPA, see note 60 infra.
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dard: "Generally, the procedural requirements of SEPA, which are
merely designed to provide full environmental information, should be invoked whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonable probability. 84a Implementing this standard in
84. 87 Wn. 2d at 278, 552 P.2d at 680 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Norway Hill
case and an analysis of issues involved in every threshold determination, see Comment, Progress
Toward a CoherentStandardforthe Negative Threshold, 54 WASH. L. REV. 159 (1978).
The Washington Supreme Court explained in a case after Norway Hill that the policy behind the
close scrutiny of the negative threshold determination was "to ensure that an agency, in considering
the need for an EIS, does not yield to the temptation of expediency thus short-circuiting the thoughtful decision-making process contemplated by SEPA." ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92
Wn. 2d 685, 700-01, 601 P.2d 501,512 (1979).
The appellate courts of Washington have had several opportunities to apply the Norway Hill standard. In ASARCO, the Washington Supreme Court found a reasonable probability of significant environmental impact in a proposal that caused severe air pollution. Washington courts also required an
EIS under the Norway Hill standard in a proposal that endangered a wildlife habitat, Swift v. Island
County, 87 Wn. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976), and in two proposals that presented radical changes
from existing land uses, Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977) (a building
permit and substantial development permit for a marina and boat moorage), and Newaukum Hill
Protective Ass'n v. Lewis County, 19 Wn. App. 162, 574 P.2d 1195 (1978) (a plan to convert farmland into 95 mobile home lots).
No environmental impact was found, however, in several cases where the proposal to rezone the
land did not include any specific plans for development. Carpenter v. Island County, 89 Wn. 2d 881,
577 P.2d 575 (1978) (annexation of land into different sewer district); Lassila v. City of Wenatchee,
89 Wn.2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978) (rezone was only an initial step taken as part of a potential
government development); Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle, 88 Wn. 2d 822, 567 P.2d 1125
(1977) (ownership of land changed hands without any intention of developing the property); Short v.
Clallam County, 22 Wn. App. 825, 593 P.2d 821 (1979) (a rezone of land for which there was no
plan for future building construction).
The proposal for an 83-unit apartment complex in an urban area presented a closer question of the
probability of a significant environmental impact. In Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v.
Young, 18 Wn. App. 405, 568 P.2d 818 (1977), the court of appeals upheld a negative threshold
determination after it examined the environmental impacts that were disclosed in the process of making that decision. Id. at 407-08, 568 P.2d at 819. (A zoning change was later imposed by the city to
permit only single family units. This change did not affect the court's disposition of the case.) Four of
the impacts discussed by the RichlandHomeowner's court were predictable, quantifiable additions to
existing impacts on human services. Specifically, the court found that these services would have
increased use to the following extent:
(1) water: less than a Ymth increase in demand;
(2) traffic: a Y,th increase on closest arterial;
(3) sewer: less than a Vlth increase in use; and
(4) schools: about a JYth increase in enrollment.
Id. at 411-12, 568 P.2d at 821-22. The court found that the burden of these additional uses was
"not negligible, [but] certainly less than moderate." Id. at 415, 568 P.2d at 823.
The court's ability to quantify the effects of the development in Richland Homeowner's distinguishes the case from those in which the development represented a significant departure from previous uses. In those cases, the court has required an EIS to determine the effect of the newly introduced
environmental problem. The Richland Homeowner's court recognized a distinction between small
increases in already existing impacts and newly introduced impacts. The court distinguished the case
from Norway Hill on the basis that the Norway Vista development was a large-scale project involving
a complete change of land use. Id. at 415 n.5, 568 P.2d at 823 n.5. It concluded that the city's
decision-making process did comply with the SEPA mandate. Id. at 416, 568 P.2d at 824.
For discussion of the fifth impact, dust, see note 107 infra.
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Norway Hill, the court held that a preliminary plat application presented a
reasonable probability of having more than a moderate effect on the environment, and that an EIS was required before the agency could consider
85
approving the preliminary plat.
The Norway Hill court determined that the SEPA official's decision not
to require an EIS was wrong. 86 Instead of requiring an EIS originally
when he noticed the potential environmental problems, the SEPA official
informally suggested project revisions and recommended to the county
council that the application be approved subject to the protective conditions. 87 The Guidelines require an EIS whenever the lead agency cannot
gather enough information through the preliminary Guideline procedures
to make an informed decision. 88 Although the Guidelines were not in effect at the time of Norway Hill, the court cited them 89 and emphasized the
importance of an EIS if the environmental effect was uncertain. 90 The
court noted that the purpose of the EIS was to provide complete information "to help the agency decide what protective conditions are
needed." 9 1 Under the Norway Hill rule, after a project proposal was submitted, if it required changes in order to receive a negative threshold determination, then the SEPA official was required to order an EIS to determine "what protective conditions are needed.' '92
Norway Hill required strict adherence to the Guidelines, which permit
the lead agency to seek further information but do not provide for the
85. 87 Wn. 2d at 279, 552 P.2d at 680-81. Approval of the preliminary plat permitted the developer to prepare the heavily wooded tract for construction of single-family dwellings including
removing the trees, grading the land, and installing paved streets. In effect, the significant environmental impact would occur before the developer's submission of a building permit application. The
area would be an eyesore and the land's value as a watershed would be destroyed; there would be
little reason to stop the developer from building houses. The supreme court opinion noted that the
project would completely change the area. Id. at 269, 552 P.2d at 675-76. The court did not explain
why it was critical to draft the EIS at the preliminary plat stage, but the court's list of the significant
environmental impacts permitted at this stage indicates that the EIS had to be drafted then, and not
later, in order to address fully the project's environmental impacts.
86. "[T~he Norway Vista project on its face involves the size and type of environmental change
to which the full information requirement of SEPA was obviously meant to apply ....
87 Wn. 2d
at 279, 552 P.2d at 681.
87. Id. at 270-71,552 P.2d at 676.
88.

WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-330(2) (1977).

89. 87 Wn. 2d at 277n. 7,552 P.2d at 680 (1977) n. 7.
90. The Norway Hill court established the standard that SEPA's procedural requirements
"should be invoked whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a
reasonableprobability." 87 Wn. 2d at 278, 552 P.2d at 680 (emphasis added). This standard is not
found in the Guidelines, which require an EIS whenever "a proposal will or could have a significant
adverse environmental impact .... " WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(10) (1977). For examples
of the application of the Norway Hill standard, see note 84 infra.
91. 87 Wn. 2d at 279,552 P.2d at 681.
92. Id.
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agency and the developer to discuss possible alterations in the project to
avoid preparation of an EIS. 93 This rule has been changed by Hayden,
which approved of discussion between agency and developer. 94 The Norway Hill standard for determining when an EIS will be required-whenever the proposed action presents a reasonable probability of moderate
impact 95-has not been altered by Hayden.
B.

The Court'sDecision in Hayden

Hayden presented the court with an opportunity to apply the Norway
Hill rule, but Hayden rejected the Norway Hill court's rigid approach. In
Norway Hill, the developer had submitted an application for a preliminary plat for a new subdivision before the King County Council informally imposed conditions and issued the negative threshold determination. 96 In Hayden, defendant Safeway did not submit a building permit
application until after the city engineer told it what changes were required
in order to obtain a negative threshold determination. 97 Safeway then
made those changes before submitting the building permit application. 98
The Norway Hill court objected to the SEPA official's approval of the
proposal before all environmental questions had been answered. 99 This
objection would seem to apply with greater force to the Hayden case,
where the SEPA official approved of the project before the developer submitted his formal application. 100 In Hayden, the SEPA official imposed
the conditions at an even earlier point in the application process, when
there had been even less chance for a reasoned analysis of all possible
environmental effects of the proposed project.
Instead of applying the Norway Hill rule, however, the Hayden court
applauded the "eminently sensible' ' 01 procedure of the city engineer:
"Where it is feasible, it appears reasonable to resolve potential environ93. See WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 197-10-330(2) (1977).
94. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 880, 613 P.2d 1164, 1170 (1980). See
generally notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text supra.
95. 87 Wn. 2d at 278, 552 P.2d at 680.
96. Id. at269,552P.2dat676.
97. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 880, 613 P.2d 1164, 1170 (1980). Safeway demonstrated early that it desired to cooperate with Port Townsend officials. On April 7, 1977,
Safeway gave the city engineer a questionnaire concerning environmental problems he could foresee.
After the city engineer returned the questionnaire, Safeway asked for a preliminary review of its

environmental checklist. Letters from Safeway officials to Port Townsend city engineer (Apr. 7,
1977 & May 6, 1977) (on file with the WashingtonLawReview).
98. 93 Wn. 2d at 880,613 P.2d at 1170.
99. Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267,
279, 552 P.2d 674, 681 (1976).
100. See note 97 supra.
101. 93Wn. 2dat880,613P.2dat 1170.
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mental problems before a formal application is made for a building permit. The pertinent question is whether environmental factors were adequately considered before a final decision was made.' 1 02 The opinion
describes the discussions held by Safeway officials and the Port Townsend city engineer' 03 but does not provide any other reasons for the decision. Apparently, the court recognized the adverse practical consequences of the inflexible Norway Hill rule. 104
C. Analysis
The Norway Hill rule effectively deprived the SEPA official of much
potential discretion by foreclosing his opportunity to substitute protective
conditions for an EIS. The SEPA official could require changes before
granting approval, but the proponent's compliance with those recommendations would not alleviate the duty to prepare an EIS. Thus, there was
little incentive for a project proponent to mitigate effects by cooperating
with the SEPA official at an early stage.
The Hayden decision creates this incentive to cooperate at an early
stage. The decision is consistent with the court's many previous efforts to
ensure that the ultimate purpose of SEPA is achieved by full consideration of ways to reduce a project's effect on the environment. 105 The Hayden court's endorsement of a more flexible approach to preliminary nego-

102. Id. at 880-81,613 P.2d at 1170.
103. Id.
104. Mr. Peter Buck, past chairman of the Washington State Bar Association Land Use and
Environmental Law Section, thinks the Norway Hill rule was "contrary to good day-to-day decisionmaking." He feels that environmental decision-making is improved by encouraging project proponents to mitigate adverse environmental effects by either modifying a project proposal or imposing
conditions; these mitigation techniques were discouraged under the Nonvay Hill rule, but they are
encouraged by the Hayden decision. He also adds:
Sensible and responsible project proponents try to identify [ways to mitigate adverse environmental impacts] as early as possible and incorporate them into their original proposal. Often the
actual proposal may include such measures and as a practical result may eliminate the potential
for adverse environmental effects. The resulting potential avoidance of the cost and delay of
preparation of an impact statement can serve as motivation for project proponents to incorporate
such mitigating measures. Hayden seems to allow for this while Norway Hill did not.
Letter from Peter Buck to author (Feb. 19, 1981) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
105. For example, in Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84
Wn. 2d 271, 279-80, 525 P.2d 774, 781 (1974), a plurality of the court commented:
The right ... to a "healthful environment" is expressly recognized as a "fundamental and
inalienable" right by the language of SEPA. The choice of this language in SEPA indicates in
the strongest possible terms the basic importance of environmental concerns to the people of this
state. It is a far stronger policy statement than that found in the National Environmental Policy
Act which reads only that "The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment... "42 U.S.C. § 433 1(c).
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tiation between developer and lead agency merely gives the lead agency's
SEPA official more discretion in achieving this ultimate purpose.
, The Hayden decision has expanded the discretionary powers of the
SEPA official by including at the negative threshold determination stage
more than the information gathering procedures outlined in the Guidelines. 106 In addition to these procedures, the agency can now ask the project proponent to make adjustments if the agency detects objectionable aspects of the project which would make a negative threshold determination
impossible. The court is correct to call the new procedure "eminently
sensible.' 1 07 The procedure is sensible economically and politically.
Economically, the inflexibility of the Norway Hill rule led to unnecessary
EIS preparation, an expense borne ultimately by the general public. Politically, the inflexibility of the Norway Hill court's interpretation of SEPA
in this critical area has caused disenchantment with the Act and could
have led to its repeal. 108 The Hayden court's response to these economic
and political concerns is not explicit in the opinion. In any case, the reAfter discussing the facts of the case, the court continued in the same vein:
The comprehensive review envisioned by SEPA is to be "'detailed' and does not invite a
lackadaisical approach." [Citation omitted.] We cannot agree with respondents' contention that
SEPA is to be construed less strictly than NEPA.... This state's act is far more emphatic than
NEPA in its legislative statement of purpose of the importance to this state's citizens of a healthful environment .... We cannot, consistent with legislative intent, give SEPA a less restrictive
interpretation.
Id. at 280, 525 P.2d at 781.
106. For a discussion of the Guideline procedures for making a threshold determination, see
notes 71-74 and accompanying text infra.
107. In Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young, 18 Wn. App. 405, 568 P.2d 818
(1977), decided seven weeks after Norway Hill, the court of appeals affirmed the city's negative
threshold determination even though the city had informally arranged with the applicant during the
threshold determination process to control dust during construction (dust control during construction
was the only environmental problem the city official foresaw). Id. at 407, 568 P.2d at 822. This case
is an anomaly for in it the court of appeals violated the letter of the Norway Hill "law." The violation
is quite insignificant: The only evidence that there was a dust problem came from a complaint lodged
by a nearby homeowner-who also was president of the plaintiff organization!
108. Disenchantment with the EIS requirement of SEPA led to the passage of Substitute Senate
Bill No. 4036 in the 1981 Regular Session of the Washington State Legislature. See Leed, SEPA an
EndangeredSpecies, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 23, 1981, § A, at 9 (president of the Washington Environmental Council criticizes the "short-sighted" efforts by the "foes of SEPA," who seek
to destroy SEPA's "rule of reason" without realizing that the consequence will be "rigidity, hardship, and unreasonable restrictions"). On May 18, 1981, Governor John Spellman vetoed this proposed amendment to WASH. Rav. CODE ch. 43.21C.
Representative Raymond Issacson of Richland, who co-sponsored Substitute House Bill No. 429,
the House equivalent of Substitute Senate Bill No. 4036, claims that the effect of the law would have
been to eliminate frivolous challenges to satisfactory EIS's. A cursory review of the bill, however,
undermines Representative Issacson's claim. Section 1 reads in part:
A final detailed statement prepared under rules and procedures established by the department
of ecology shall be considered adequate for the purpose of this chapter seven days after the date
of publication of the final detailed statement. The adequacyof afinal detailedstatementshall not
be subjectto judicialreview if a procedure for administrative appeal is available.
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sponse is not at the expense of SEPA's core purpose. 109 Far from conflict-

ing with that purpose, the court's decision will facilitate a more efficient
and continuing responsiveness to that purpose.
Narrowly construed, the Norway Hill rule I 0 forbade informal sugges-

tion or imposition of revisions after the project application was submitted. II1However, the public policy considerations of Norway Hill-to
ensure full consideration of environmental values' '2 -would
seem to
apply with even more force to Hayden. Because the contact between
Safeway and the city engineer in Hayden was not within the Guideline
procedures, 113 abuse of the SEPA mandate could occur without detection. 114 Furthermore, although there are chronological differences between Norway Hill and Hayden, "15 they are insignificant in light of an
overriding similarity: In both cases the challenged applications repre-

sented the last opportunity to study the environmental effects of the project. Despite this compelling similarity, the Hayden court does not follow
Substitute Senate Bill No. 4036, § I (emphasis added). This section would have severely limited
citizen participation in environmental decision-making in two ways. First, a person challenging the
adequacy of an EIS would have been required to file the appeal within seven days of the publication
of the EIS. This short appeal period would have cut off valid challenges by concerned citizens who
delayed only a short time.
Second, and more important, this section would have eliminated judicial review if an administrative appeal procedure was available. Administrative procedures would not have provided adequate
review because the appeal procedure did not need to be undertaken by an independent body. If the
review procedure were conducted by the department which authorized the allegedly inadequate EIS,
the initial decision regarding the adequacy of the EIS would have been accorded excessive deference
by these self-interested reviewers.
Section 2 of Substitute Senate Bill No. 4036 was a more direct attack on SEPA. The purpose of
this section was to promote land development by exempting from the EIS requirement for the next
two years residential developments containing no more than one hundred lots or three hundred "attached dwelling units." The exemption would have applied only in King, Spokane, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties, the state's four most populous counties. The attempt to exempt projects of this
magnitude from the EIS requirement directly contradicts the environmental values at the core of
SEPA. A Seattle Post-lntelligencer editorial condemned these "haphazard exemptions from land
development laws" and praised State Land Commissioner Brian Boyle for urging Governor John
Spellman to veto the bill. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 11,1981, § A, at 8.
109. See note 60 supra.
110. The Nornvay Hill rule and Nonvay Hill standard are different and distinct concepts. See
notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
11l. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267.
279, 552 P.2d 674, 681 (1976).
112. Id. at 272, 552 P.2d at 677. The Washington Reports version of this passage reads: "The
mechanism through which this environmental consideration is accomplished is the detailed [EISI."
The version is an improvement over that which appears in the Pacific Reporter: "the [sic ) basis upon
which the responsible ronmental [sic] consideration is accomplished is the detailed [EIS]."
113. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
114. The supreme court opinion does not suggest any impropriety on the part of Safeway. For
discussion of possible abuse which could occur, see notes 118 & 119 and accompanying text infra.
115. For a discussion of these chronological differences, see notes 96-100 and accompanying
text supra.
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the Norway Hill rule. As a result, the Norway Hill rule retains little, if
any, practical force. Developers will avail themselves of the informal opportunities which were approved in Hayden. 116 The Hayden court abandons the Norway Hill rule sub silentio.
The Norway Hill rule was inadequate because it inflexibly required the
preparation of environmental impact statements in circumstances where
they could and should have been avoided by minor preliminary adjustments. 117 The Hayden rule, on the other hand, may prove unworkable if
SEPA officials do not responsibly use their discretionary powers. n s The
new rule may also prove inadequate when an inexperienced SEPA official
with limited resources deals with a developer who is well versed in the
Act's intricacies. In such circumstances, the developer's superior resources and expertise might allow him to gain approval of a project by
concealing or misrepresenting potential impacts from the SEPA official.
This pessimistic scenario is unlikely to be repeated often, however, given
society's concern for environmental values. 119
D. Summary
The new Hayden rule returns a greater degree of control to local government and will more efficiently serve to protect the environment. If the
Hayden rule leads to results contrary to the mandate of SEPA, however,
we can expect a return to a less flexible rule with the attendant wasteful
preparation of unnecessary environmental impact statements.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The two holdings of Hayden discussed in this note balance a gain for
environmentalists against a gain for developers. The laches doctrine will
be less of a threat to environmental groups who have reasonable excuses
for delay. 120 The discretionary powers vested in SEPA officials will result
in fewer unnecessary environmental impact statements.
Although the court is not directly reversing itself on either of these issues, it is puzzling that it does not acknowledge in Hayden that it is signi116. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 880-81, 613 P.2d 1164, 1170 (1980).
117. See note 104supra.
118. This kind of impropriety did not occur in Hayden, according to the supreme court opinion.
119. But see note 108 supra (discussion of a recent unsuccessful effort in the state legislature to
repudiate the values of SEPA).
120. Developers can circumscribe the environmentalists' gain by utilizing SEPA's notice procedure. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.080 (1979). This section allows developers to commence a thirtyday statute of limitations on suits against a private development. See notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text supra.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 56:549, 1981

ficantly modifying the rules established in forceful language in Lopp' 2 l
and Norway Hill. 122 Perhaps this omission indicates a feeling of the court
that those prior positions are best forgotten. Indeed, they probably are
best ignored, as the new approaches to the laches doctrine and the negative threshold determination are positive steps towards a more reasonable-while still responsive-policy of environmental protection.

Deane W. Minor

121.

Lopp v. Peninsula School Dist., 90 Wn. 2d 754,759, 585 P.2d 801, 804 (1978).

122. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267,
279, 552 P.2d 674, 681 (1976).
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